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Introduction

In information based systems, the integrity of the informatiou is ('(JlulIlonly provided for by requiring that (('rtain operation(s) ClIl hc caITi(~cl out only hy OUt~ or
more participants who havc access rights, Acccss is gaincd by a key, pass\\"Ord or
token, and go\'crned by a sccure key mauagemcut scheme, If th,' key or password
is shared betwecn se\'cral participants in such a way that it can bt' rt'(,(Hlstruct.t'tI
only by a responsible group acting in agreement, theu a high degrce of security
is attained, Sharcd sccurity systems, of this sort, are also used in fiu<lucial institutions, in communication networb, in computing systems sen'iug cducational
institutions and distribution environments, Howc\'cr, thc b('st known exalIlples
of sharcd sccurity systems are in the military: for instance, in <Icti\'atiug a nuclear wcapon, several scnior officers llIuSt concur before the [Jec(~ssary password
can be reconstructed,
\\'e describc another situation which llloti\'atl's the subject of sl'nd sh;lring:
The hC(ld of (In oT'glmi::(ltiun kceps impurtlmt documcnts in a safc uJ
which only he aI' she knows the cumbination, HuweveT', the hewl is often absent J01' extended pCT'iuds (lnd occasionally inJo1"lIwtill"Tl is ncedd
J7'01II ducuments in till' ,mJI! in oHlel' to 7llaintain thc dlly-tu-dIlY 1"1I,nnin.'l
uJ the uT'ganization, The head deems it undesimble JOT' the wmuinlltiun
to be tmsted to anyone of the fivc executive bO(lnl mC1IIlie1"s, What is
n!ganlcd IlS acap/able, /WU)(!lIC1', is a cU1ll.]J1"IJlltise ,~'itllali()n wh(Tcb" al
least two of the e:reCldiue bOll1'd memue1'S acting togcthe1' can gain access
to the safe,

Can such a systelll be devised'?
Figure 1 provides a system to soh'e the ab()\'e problelll,
are chosen in projective space PG(2, q) where q 2: 5, It is
the safe cOlllbination is a point on line I but the actual
Each of the five executives is privately given a point on

The lines awl points
publicly known that
point is kl'pt SCCrt!t.
lilL(' 1H aud thl' safe
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Fig. 1. A projccti"e space

combination is chosen to be point Po, the unique point of intersection of line 11!
and line i. Any two executives can generate line TIl and hence evaluate Po by
intersecting Tn and 1. Howevcr, one executive acting alone knows only that tlw
safe combination must be onc of the points on linc i-the actual point remains
sccret since for every point p on line i there is a unique line passing through the
executive's point and p.
SeC7·et sharing schemes are systems designed to solve problems of a similar
type to the one we have just discussed. In general, there is a group of potential
members of such a scheme and a collection of sets of these members which are
desired to have access to some protected information.
Thc information is protected by distributing to each member of the scheme
an amount of partial information which relates in some way to the protected
information. This partial information is known only to the individual member
to whom it is distributed and it is held secret by them. \Vhen any group of members of the scheme who are desired to have access to the protected information
choose to do so, they can reconstruct it by pooling their pieces of partial information. Thus, in our opening problem, any two pieces of the partial information
distributed to the executives must be sufficient to (mablc the combination of til('
safe to be determined.
Secrct sharing schemes were first introduccd by D1aklcy [2], Shamir [HI] and
Chaulll [4] in 1979, and slibsequently have been studied by IlIlmcrons other
authors. For a gcneral discussion of shared sccret schemes, see Simlllons' paper
[20]. A number of mathematical structures have been used to mudel shared
secret schemes. Somc of thcse are polynomials, geometric configurations, block
dcsigns, Recd-Solumon codcs, vcct.or spaccs, mat.roids, near-right fields, cumplct.e
multipartitc graphs, orthogonal arrays and Latin squares. In this paper, we will
model a new secrct sharing scheme based on Room squares,
In most real-world applications there is also a need for a hierarchy to be built
into thc shared security systcm. That is, the key and password is sharcd betwecn
s individuals of rank 1, ... , r so that if a person of rank i is incapacitated, thcn
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a person of rank j > i, or a set of individuals of rank I < i, lIlay replace the
lost data. Brickell [3], SimIllons [20) and Cooper, DOnO\'iln amI SejwlTY [8) have
adapted the basic schemes and const.ructed llIultiJ('vd schemes.
\Ve shall now introduce a more formal terminology for secret sharing schemes.

2

Secret sharing schemes

A secr'et sharing scheme is a method of sharing a secret 5 alllollg a Hili te set of
participants P in such a way that if the participants in A ~ P are qualified to
know the secret, then by pooling together their shares, they can reconstruct the
secret 5; but any set B C P, which is not qualified to know 5, cannot reconstruct
the secret. The key 5 is chosen by a special participant D called the dealer and
it is usually assumed that D f; P. The dealer gives partial information called a
share to each participant to share the secret S.
Secret sharing schemes arc useful in any important action that requires the
concurrence of several designated people to be initiated as described in the examples in Section 1.
An access structure
is the family of all the subsets of participants that
are able to reconstruct the secret. An access structure is said to be monotone if
any set which contains a subset, that can recover the secret, can itself recover
the secret, that is, if for any subsets B alld C of P, where B ~ C and B E
then C E r. The subsets of P belonging to the access structure r are called
authorized sets and those not belonging to the access structure are termed as
unauthorized sets.

r

r,

Example 1. In Figure 1, the secret sets are the points on line I and the secret is
the point Po. The shares are the five points on line 11t that are distributed to five
participants. Finally, observing that P is the set of five participants, we have the
access structure:
r = {A ~ P: IAI ~ 2}
One property of a monotone access structure is that it has a unique collection
of authorized sets of minimal size. \Ve defiue
E
to be a minimal set of if
C E C ~ B implies C B. The collection of all minimal sets of is denoted
by
A (k,7I) thr'eshold scheme allows a secret to be shared among'T! participants
in such a way that any k of them call recover the secret, but no group of k - 1,
or fewer participants, can do so.
A monotone access structure
defined on a participant set P such that
IPI = nand = {X ~ P : IXI ~ k} is known as (k, TIl threshold access
structure.
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Example 2. A Latin square of order 11 is an TI x TI array of the integers 1, 2, ... ,
n such that each integer occurs precisely once in each row and each column. In
this example, we take a Latin square L of order 3 as a (2,3) threshold scheme.
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Let S = {(2,1;2),(3,2;1),(1,3;3)}, a partial Latin square, be the union of
some critical sets of L, where (2,1 ;2) means that integer 2 is at position (2,1),
(3,2;1) means that integer 1 is at position (3,2) and (1,3;3) means that integer 3
is at position (1,3) in the Latin square L. We can construct a 2-out-of-3 secret
sharing scheme on this set. The Latin square L is kept secret but its order is
made public. When any two participants from S collaborate, they combine their
shares and reconstruct the unique Latin square containing their shares.
A secret sharing scheme is said to be perfect provided the following two
properties are satisfied:
(i) If an authorized subset of participants A ~ P pool their shares, then they
can determine value of the secret S.
(ii) If an unauthorized subset of participants B c P pool their shares, then they
call determine nothing more than any outsider about the value of the secret

S.
The security of such a scheme is unconditional since we do not place allY limit
on the amount of cOlllputatioll that can be performed by a subset of participants.
The size of each share is defined as the number of bits s of nOll-redundant
information ill the share. The size of the secret t is the number of bits of nonredulldant information in the secret. How to exactly determine s alld t is not yet
known.
III a multilevel scheme, the participants are ranked and placed in levels
rj, ... ,rw. \Ve assulIle that there are Ii participants in level ri for i = 1, ... ,w.
So l: Ii = l. A secret key S is chosen and I pieces of related information distributed, one piece to each participant. This is done in such a way that the secret
can be recovered from the shares of ti participants of rank ri.

3

Room squares

A Room squU1·e R of order l' is an 1" x 1" array each of whose cells Illay either
be cmpty or contain all unordcred pair of objects 0,1,2, ... , 1·, subject to the
following conditions:
(i) each of the objects 0,1,2, ... , r occurs precisely once in each row of Rand
precisely once in each colulIln of R, and
every possible unordered pair of objects occurs precisely once in the whole
array.

Theorem 1. (Mullin and Wallis [18]) There exists a Room squure
odd integer order l' greater than or equal to 7.

0/ every
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\Ve denote N r == 0,1,2, ... r. A Room square of order r based on N r is .standar·dized if the ith diagonal cell, cell(i,i), contains {O, i} for 1 s:; i s:; T.
A skew Room square R is a standardized Room square with the property
that when i I- j, either the (i,j) or the (j, i) cell of R is occupied, but not both.
Two Room squares are said to be isomorphic if one can be obtained from
the other by permuting the rows and columns and relabeling the elements. Two
Room squares Rand S are equivalent if R is isomorphic to S or to the transpose
of S. All inequivalent Room squares of order 7 and 9 have been found by onefactorizations of graph, see [1,11,22] for details. There are exactly 6 inequivalent
Room squares of order 7 and 257,630 inequivalent Room squares for order 9. No
exact values of inequivalent Room squares are still known for higher order Room
squares, although there are:
526,915,620 non-isomorphic one-factorizations of order 11,
9.876 x 1028 distinct one-factorizations of order 13,
1.148 x 10 44 distinct one-factorizations of order 15,
1.520 x 10 63 distinct one-factorizations of order 17,
and the number of all inequivalent Room squares for each of these orders are
even much larger, see [10] for details.
A partial Room square R of order r is an r x r array each of whose cells may
either be empty or contain an unordered pair of objects 0,1,2, ... , r, subject to
the following conditions:
(i) each of the objects 0, 1,2, ... , r occurs at most once in each row of R and at
most once in each colullln of R, and
(ii) eyery possible unordered pair of objects occurs at most Ollce in the whole
array.
A critical set Q == {Q!, Q2, Q3, ... , Qc}, IQI == c, in a Room square R of order
is a set of quadruples Qa == (i,j;k,l) such that if any Qa is removed from
the set, it can no longer be uniquely completed. In Qa, (i,j) shows the position
of the pair (k,l) in the square. That is, Q provides minimal informaticn from
which R can be reconstructed uniquely. In this paper, we consider that empty
positions with '-' in the Room square are given.
Q' is a minimal critical set (min.cs) of a Room square R if IQ'I == cis
minimum for all critical sets Q of a Room square of order r whereas Q' is a
maximal critical set (max.cs) of a Room square R if IQ'I == c is the largest for
all critical sets Q of a Room square of order r.

T,

Example 3. Room square of order 7:

8,1 - 4,5 6,7 - - 2,3
5,7 8,2 - - - 1,3 4,6
- 5,6 8,3 1,2 - 4,7 - 3,7 - 8,4 2,6 - 1,5
3,6 1,4 2,7 - 8,5 - 2,4 - - 3,5 1,7 8,6 - 1,6 - 3,4 2,5 8,7
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Critical set 1 of above square is:

** - 4,5 ** - - 2,3
** ** - - - 1,3 4,6
- ** 8,3 1,2 - 4,7 - ** - ** 2,6 - 1,5
** ** ** - ** - ** - - ** ** ** - - ** - ** ** **
Critical set 2 of above square is:

** - ** ** - - **
** 8,2 - - - ** **
- ** 8,3 1,2 - ** - 3,7 - 8,4 ** - **
** ** ** - 8,5 - ** - - ** 1,7 8,6 - - ** - ** ** **
where "**" shows an unknown pair position and "-" shows an empty position
in the square,
So the critical set 1 for the above Room square is: Q == {(1,3;4,5), (1,7;2,3),
(2,6;1,3), (2,7;4,6), (3,3;8,3), (3,4;1,2), (3,6;4,7), (4,5;2,6), (4,7;1,5)}. That is, Q
is the only Room square of order 7 with a pair 4,5 at position (1,3), pair 2,3 at
position (1,7), pair 1,3 at position (2,6), pair 4,6 at position (2,7), pair 8,3 at
Jlosition (3,3), pair 1,2 at position (3,4), pair 4,7 at position (3,6), pair 2,6 at
position (4,5) and pair 1,5 at position (4,7).
There is very little known about critical sets ill Room squares. Chaudhry and
Seberry [5] studied critical sets in Room squares for orders 7, 9 and 1 L

4

Proposed scheme

A secret sharing scheme can be constructed in which the secret key is a Room
square R of order r. This scheme exhibits the following characteristics: The
Room square is taken to be the secret key and therefore kept private. 'However,
the order of the Room square is made public. The shares in the secret are based
on a partial Room square S == {UAi I Ai is a critical set in R }. The union
can be taken over al! possible critical sets in R or over some subset of critical
sets. The number of critical sets used will be dependent on the size of the Room
square and the number of participants in the secret sharing scheme, The access
structure will be the set = {B I B ~ Sand B ;2 A where A is some critical set
is monotone. The protocol for secret sharing
in R }. One can easily see that
scheme, involving 1 participants and based on a Room square is as follows.

r

r

A Room square R of order r is chosen. The number
the Room square R is kept secret to be the key.

T

is made public, but
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A set 5 which is the union of a number of critical sets in R is defined.
For each (i,j;k,l) E 5, the share (i,j;k,l) is distributed privately to a
participant.
- When a group of participants whose shares constitute a critical set come
together, they can reconstruct the Room square R and hence the secret key.
\Ve demonstrate here how the scheme works on a small example and then
give a more general construction.
Take a Room square of order 7 given in example 3. Let 5 be the partial Room square {(1,3;4,5), (1,7;2,3), (2,2;2,8), (2,6;1,3), (2,7;4,6), (3,3;8,3),
(3,4;1,2), (3,6;4,7), (4,2;3,7), (4,4;4,8), (5,5;5,8), (4,5;2,6), (4,7;1,5), (6,5;1,7),
(6,6;6,8) }. All the parties are told that the order of the Room square is 7.
Each participant is given a share (i,j; k,l), for one such element of 5. In order to recover the secret, an authorized group of participants must place their
shares in a partial Room square. They then reconstruct the unique Room square
containing these entries. These authorized groups are based on the critical sets
contained in 5. Two of the critical sets contained in 5 are:
Al = {(I,3;4,5), (1, 7;2,3)' (2,6; 1,3), (2, 7;4,6), (3,3;8,3),
(3,4;1,2),(3,6;4,7),(4,5;2,6),(4,7;1,5)}
.4. 2 ::: {(2, 2; 2, 8), (3, 3; 8, 3), (3, 4; 1,2), (4,2; 3, 7),
(4,4;4,8),(5,5;5,8),(6,5; 1,7),(6,6;6,8)}

Note that lAd = 9 while IA21 ::: 8.
Now for a more general example. Let R be a Room square of order rand Q
be a critical set. Define Q::: {Q' I Q' is the isotopic image of Q}. Let 5' ::: {Q' I
Q' E Q and Q' is a critical set in R}. We may use the protocol given above to
construct a secret sharing scheme where the shares are drawn from the set 5'.
The following points should be made about the secret sharing scheme.
- Since the authorized groups are based on critical sets in Room squares, the
absence of one share implies that secret cannot be recovered uniquely.
- The scheme is obviously not perfect as an outsider can guess from the set
of all possible Room squares of order T, whereas an unauthorized group of
parti(:ipants knows that the Room square must contain the partial Room
square defined by their shares.
- The security of the scheme is based on the number of possible Room squares
containing the partial Room square defined by an unauthorized group of
participants.
- The number of inequivalent Room squares for higher order grows exponeutially as mentioned earlier. The number of inequivalent Room squares of
order greater than or equal to 11 are still unknown under the current computing resources, although lower bounds on these numbers are known. So
the probability of guessing a secret key consisting of a Room square of order
greater than or equal to 11 is very very small, and the scheme is very secure
though not perfect.

Secret sharing schemes based on Room squares
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Key management scheme

In this section we consider the situations where there are a number of secret
sharing schemes all of which contain a common participant. This participant
may be required to remember a number of shares. For example, a medical administrator (Registrar) may require access to several restricted files. These files
may contain, say, patient data, hospital resources and organ bank data. Access
to these files may be via a secret sharing scheme in which the registrar of the
hospital always has a critical role. The registrar always has to remember several
different shares. This obviously increases the complexity of the registrar's role
and consequently reduces the security of the schemes.
We wish to model a key management scheme in which a secret key is common
to a number of secret sharing schemes. The shares related to this key are such
that a primary share is held by one participant and this share is a necessary part
of the reconstruction process in each scheme. Each scheme will involve a number
of minor shares which when combined with the primary share can be used to
reconstruct the secret. It is also required that the secret can not be reconstructed
uniquely from the combined information held by the minor shares.
Inequivalent critical sets in a Room square can be used to model a key management scheme of this nature. We illustrate this with an example. Take the
Room square of order 7 given in example 3. Following are three distinct minimal
critical sets of this Room square which have the common pairs (3,3;8,3) and
(3,4;1,2).

== {(I, 3; 4, 5), (1, 7; 2, 3), (2, G; 1,3), (2, 7; 4, G), (3, 3; 8, 3),
(3,4;1,2),(3,6;4,7),(4,5;2,G),(4,7;1,5)}
A2 == {(2,2; 2,8), (3,3; 8, 3), (3,4; 1,2), (4,2; 3, 7),
Al

(4,4;4,8),(5,5;5,8),(6,5;1,7),(6,6;6,8)}

A3 == {(I, 1; 1,8), (1,3; 4, 5), (1,4; 6, 7), (2, 1; 5, 7), (2, 7; 4, 6),
(3,3;8,3),(3,4;1,2),{4,7;1,5),(1,5;3,G),(6,6;6,8)}
Note that lAd == 9, IA21 =: 8 and IA31 =: 10.
Each department is assigned a different critical set Ai with the same participant receiving a share which is common to each Ai. In this case the registrar
will be given the common share (3,3;8,3) or (3,4;1,2). All departments will reconstruct the same secret, but each has a different set of keys to this secret.
However if all participants in the minor (lower than registrar) level pool their
shares, the secret cannot be reconstructed uniquely.
Another key management scheme can be developed to allow each department
a different secret, but still have a common primary share using inequivalent
Room squares of same order with some common pairs and same positions.
Multilevel schemes, based on critical sets of Room squares, can also be developed in which some participants are more important than others. In multilevel
schemes, the share of a participant at level j can be replaced by two or more
participants at level i, where i < j. Consider the case of an electronic transfer
of funds between financial institutions. This transfer can only be initiated when
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an electronic signat.ure is recciwd. The signat.ure will he n'cOllst.ructed whcn the
shares of two senior tellers ami one vic(~-pn~sident or two vi("!~-Jlrcsi(knts, are
entered. Critical sets for Room squares fulfilling these requirements are still not
known.

6

Conclusion

In this paper, we have proposed a secret sharing scheme based on crit.ical sets
of Room squares. Since there is very little known about critical sets of Room
squares, the implementation of this scheme is limited at the moment. However,
the directions for future research are:
Construct families of critical sets for Room squares.
Construct families of smallest and largest critical sets for Room squares
without a priori constraints on the Room square.
Quantify the security .of the scheme more effectively, that is, decide which
critical sets are more secure than others.
Find a general process that will start with an access structure and result in
a Room square.
Investigate the structure of critical sets from Room squares to see if possible
to construct perfect secret sharing schemes.
Devise multilevel schemes based on critical sets of Room squares.
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